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SQUARING THE CIRCLE: DEMOCRATIZING JUDICIAL REVEW  
AND THE COUNTER-CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTY 
 
Miguel Schor1 
I. Introduction: the Counter-Constitutional Difficulty 
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none 
deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control 
the violence of faction.  The friend of popular government never finds himself so 
much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their 
propensity to this dangerous vice.  He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value to 
any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides 
a proper cure for it.  The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into 
public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular 
governments have everywhere perished.2  
A season in the appointments war 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was the swing vote in a closely divided Supreme 
Court.  In decisions decided 5 to 4 from 1994 through 2005, Justice O’Connor had the 
highest batting average of all the justices as she voted with the majority 77% of the time.3  
The announcement of her retirement on July 1, 2005 launched a barrage of interest group 
activity.4  The sense of urgency was heightened by the death of Chief Justice William 
                                                 
1 Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School.  This work in 
progress will appear in 16 MINN. J. INT’L L. (2007).  This Article was presented at the 
Law and Society conference held in Baltimore, MD, July 6-9.  I would like to thank the 
members of the panel—Sheldon Goldman, Diana Panke, and David L. Weiden—for their 
comments and suggestions.  I would also like to thank Frank Rudy Cooper, Lisa Hilbink, 
Donald Kommers, Robert Justin Lipkin, Jessica Silbey, Mark Tushnet, Alexei Trochev, 
and Stephen Wasby for their comments and suggestions.  They obviously bear no 
responsibility for any errors.   
2 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 129 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 
1996). 
3 Linda Greenhouse, Consistently a Pivotal Role, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at A1. 
4 Robin Toner, After a Brief Shock, Advocates Quickly Mobilize, N.Y. TIMES, July 
2, 2005, at A1 (“By midday [of her announcement], nothing less than a national political 
campaign had begun.”); David E. Rosenbaum & Lynette Clemetson, In Battle to Confirm 
a New Justice, Both Sides Get Troops Ready Again, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, at A19 
(noting presciently that this battle might be different than previous ones because Christian 
conservatives were “springing into action” and were “far better organized and 
sophisticated than they were when the first President Bush named Justice Thomas to the 
court”); and Thomas B. Edsall, Court Fundraising Fury Underway, WASHINGTON POST, , 
July 5, 2005, at A04 (observing that the “effort to fill the Supreme Court seat being 
vacated by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has already become a fundraising magnet for 
both left and right”). 
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Rehnquist on September 3, 2005.  The Rehnquist Court had gone eleven years without 
any change in its membership5 and President Bush now had two vacancies to fill.  
Although hot button issues such as abortion6 and same-sex marriage7 mobilized the 
ideological forces arrayed in the appointments brawl engendered by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s death and Justice O’Connor’s retirement, the Rehnquist Court reflected 
broader ideological conservative currents that look askance at the growth of federal 
power.8 
The opening salvo was fired by conservative groups who met within hours of 
Justice O’Connor’s retirement.  They sought to prevent President Bush from nominating 
his attorney general, Alberto R. Gonzales, because they believed his views on abortion to 
be suspect.9  The debate became so heated that President Bush and the Senate Republican 
leadership asked conservatives to avoid divisive cultural issues such as abortion and 
same-sex marriage in discussing nominations and to use language that tested well in polls 
such as a “fair and dignified confirmation process.”10  President Bush’s nomination of 
Judge John Roberts dampened down the fighting as Roberts had both a distinguished 
resume and a thin record on divisive social issues.11  The only real opposition President 
Bush might have faced in nominating Judge Roberts to the Supreme Court was among 
social conservatives.  The White House, however, had carefully prepared for this 
possibility by spreading the word for at “least a year” before Judge Roberts’s nomination 
that he was safe on issues such as “abortion, same-sex marriage, and public support for 
                                                 
5 Linda Greenhouse, Under the Microscope Longer Than Most, N.Y. TIMES, July 
10, 2005, at __. 
6 A Pew research center analysis states “Clearly, Americans believe that no single 
issue before the court has greater importance” than abortion.  The Pew Research Center 
For the People & The Press, Abortion, the Court and the Public, Oct. 3, 2005, 
http://people.org/commentary/pdf/119.pdf.  
7 Conservatives have mobilized in opposition to gay marriage which they see as 
the “new abortion” as it is a “culture-altering change being implemented by judicial fiat.”  
Russell Shorto, What’s Their Real Problem with Gay Marriage (It’s the Gay Part), N.Y. 
TIMES,  June 19, 2005, at __. 
8 Thomas Keck writes that when it comes to federal power, the Rehnquist Court 
“has been the least deferential of any in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court striking 
down thirty provisions from 1995 to 2001.”  THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST 
SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 2 (2004). 
9 Adam Nagourney et al., Conservative Groups Rally Against Gonzales as Justice, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, at A1. 
10 David D. Kirkpatrick & Carl Hulse, G.O.P. Asks Conservatives to Cool 
Rhetoric Over the Court, July 6, 2005, at A1 and Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Urges 
Civility in Debate Over Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at __. 
11 Linda Greenhouse, A Judge Anchored in Modern Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 
2005, at A1; Adam Nagourney, The Strategy for a Successful Nomination: Disarm 
Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005 at A14; and Todd S. Purdum, In Pursuit of 
Conservative Stamp, President Nominates Roberts, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005, at A1. 
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religion.”12  During the Senate hearings on his appointment, Judge Roberts articulated a 
pragmatic and eclectic approach to interpreting the Constitution that put him at variance 
with Justices Scalia and Thomas.13  Roberts was confirmed by a vote of 78 to 22. 
President Bush’s nomination of White House Counsel Harriet Ellan Miers on 
October 3, 2005, however, led to a firestorm on the President’s right flank.  Editorials 
were written by prominent public intellectuals criticizing Miers’s closeness to the 
President and lack of talent.14  Conservatives broke decisively with the President over her 
nomination even though the White House and its allies repeatedly sought to reassure 
social conservatives.15  Social conservatives had long sought to remake the Court and 
believed that Harriet Miers lacked the judicial DNA they desired in a justice.16  The 
interest group activity revolving around her nomination had a surreal quality as liberal 
interest groups largely held their fire while conservatives paid for television 
advertisements featuring Robert Bork that opposed her nomination.17  Conservative 
opposition played an important role in Miers’s decision to withdraw her nomination on 
October 27, 2005.18   
                                                 
12 David D. Kirkpatrick, A Year of Work to Sell Roberts to Conservatives, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 22, 2005, at A14. 
13 Hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on The Nomination of John G. 
Roberts to be Chief Justice of the United States, Sept. 12, 2005. 
14 Randy E. Barnett, Cronyism: Alexander Hamilton Wouldn’t Approve of Justice 
Harriet Miers, WALL ST. JOURNAL, Oct. 4, 2005, at A26 and George F. Will, Can This 
Nomination Be Justified, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 5, 2005, at A23. 
15 David D. Kirkpatrick, The Crisis of the Bush Code, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at 
__ (noting the disappointment of many conservatives by Miers’s nomination even though 
Karl Rove telephoned “prominent conservative Christians . . . to enlist their support” 
before her selection was announced to the public); Fred Barbash, Religion Was a Factor 
in Miers’s Nomination, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 12, 2005, at __ (observing that President 
Bush sought to reassure conservatives by suggesting that Miers’s religion was part of the 
reason he nominated her); and John H. Fund, Judgment Call, WALL ST. JOURNAL, Oct. 
17, 2005, at A20 (stating that two close friends of Harriet Miers’s, both of whom were 
judges, opined in a conference call made by religious conservatives the day her 
nomination was announced that she would overrule Roe v. Wade).   
16 Dan Balz, Right Sees Miers as a Threat to Dream, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 7, 
2005, at A01 (reporting that social conservatives are united by a “passionate desire to 
change the Supreme Court” and fear Harriet Miers because “so little is known” about 
her).  See Part II(A) infra. 
17 Brennan Center for Justice, Three Nominations Reveal Contrasting Influence of 
Interest Groups in High Court Nomination Process, Jan. 26, 2006, 
www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/releases_2006.  
18 Robin Toner et al., Steady Erosion in Support Undercut Nomination, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A16 (Senator Brownback noted that social conservatives were 
unwilling to support Miers because “’They had been burnt so many times before. . . . 
They really wanted to know.’”); Howard Kurz, Conservative Pundits Packed a Real 
Punch, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 28, 2005, at C01 (“As newspapers began digging out 
past speeches and writings by Miers on such subjects as affirmative action and abortion, 
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Miers’s withdrawal was quickly followed by the nomination of Judge Samuel A. 
Alito, Jr.  His impeccable conservative record mobilized interest groups along more 
natural fault lines than had Miers’s nomination.19  The caliber of his intellectual 
credentials meant that his nomination would have to be opposed on mainly ideological 
grounds.20  A pair of memorandums written by Alito opposing abortion when he had 
been a member of the Reagan administration, however, did not lead to an all out 
ideological fight21 even though interest groups on the left and the right sought to mobilize 
their supporters.22  Judge Alito explained that the memos were his personal rather than 
his judicial views which successfully dampened some of the opposition.23  His measured 
words during his Judiciary Committee hearings further defused the opposition.24  There 
was much stronger opposition to Judge Alito in the Senate, however, than there had been 
to Judge Roberts because of Judge Alito’s embrace of originalism in constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                 
right-leaning pundits grew even more alarmed that she was insufficiently conservative.”); 
Peter Baker & Amy Goldstein, Nomination was Plagued by Missteps From the Start, 
WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 28, 2005, at A01 (William Kristol opposed Miers in spite of 
Karl Rove’s entreaties and opined “’What this shows is that for conservatives, the 
Supreme Court is so central’ that they were unwilling to stay silent.”); and Jonathan 
Weisman, The Rift’s Repercussions Could Last Rest of Term, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 
28, 2005, at A08 (Richard A. Viguerie, an “architect of the conservative movement, . . . 
[stated] ‘But we [opposed Miers] because it was all about the courts, all about the courts. 
. . . Then when [President Bush] betrayed us on a Supreme Court nominee, that just woke 
us all up.’”)   
19 Charles Lane, Alito Leans Right where O’Connor Swung Left, WASHINGTON 
POST, Nov. 1, 2005, at A01 and Todd S. Purdum, Potentially, the First Shot in an All-Out 
Ideological War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005, at __. 
20 Scott Shane, Ideology Serves as a Wild Card in Senate Debate on Court Pick, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at A1. 
21 Samuel A. Alito, Memorandum to the Solicitor General re Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstreticians and Gynecologists, May 30, 1985 and Samuel A. 
Alito, Personal Qualifications Statement, Nov. 15, 1985. 
22 David D. Kirkpatrick, One Nominee, Two Very Different Portraits in a New 
Round of Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2005, at A26 and Jo Becker, Television Ad Wars on 
Alito Begins, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 18, 2005, at A03.  Interest groups spent 
$2,407,392 on television advertisements for Alito’s nomination which, while 
significantly lower than some initial estimates, was almost twice which was spent on 
Roberts’s nomination.  Brennan Center for Justice, supra note __. 
23 Charles Babington, Alito Distances Himself From  1985 Memos, WASHINGTON 
POST, Dec. 3, 2005, at A01 and Charles Lane, For Alito, a Tricky Question of Statements 
vs. Thoughts, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 4, 2005, at A08. 
24 Charles Babington & Amy Goldstein, Alito Stresses the Rule of Law in Opening 
Statement, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 10, 2006, at A01.   
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interpretation during his hearings25 and his conservative track record.  Judge Alito was 
confirmed by a divided Senate vote of 58 to 42 largely along party lines.26 
The appointments of John Roberts and Samuel A. Alito represent the culmination 
of two decades of efforts by conservatives to remake the Supreme Court.27  The 
mobilization of social conservatives has been fueled by opposition to abortion and same-
sex marriage, and a desire for a greater role for religion in the public life of the nation.28  
The extraordinary split among conservatives over the appointment of Harriet Miers 
illustrates the importance that social conservatives attach to judicial nominations.  By 
opposing Miers’s nomination, social conservatives made it clear that they would not be 
satisfied by a conservative nominee who lacked a clear track record on issues important 
to them.  There is, of course, no assurance that either Justice Roberts or Justice Alito will 
vote in ways that please social conservatives.  Predicting how a justice will vote based on 
an ideological label is an uncertain science, as political scientists Lee Epstein and Jeffrey 
Segal concede.29  The internal dynamics of the Supreme Court sometimes lead Justices to 
change their ideology over time.  In spite of this uncertainty, however, the heightened 
role that interest groups play in judicial nominations is helping to create a more 
ideological and partisan Court.30  As the events of the current appointments season draw 
to a close, it is clear that constitutional politics is being transformed by the efforts of 
interest groups to place their partisans on the nation’s highest court.  This Article will 
explore the role that popular mobilization plays in constitutional politics in comparative 
perspective.  
                                                 
25 Adam Liptak, Few Glimmers of How Conservative Judge Alito Is, NEW YORK 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at A1 and Charles Lane, A Right Cautious Nominee, WASHINGTON 
POST, Jan. 13, 2006, at A06. 
26 Charles Babington, Alito is Sworn in on High Court, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 
1, 2006, at A01 and David D. Kirkpatrick, Alito Sworn In as Justice After Senate Gives 
Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A21. 
27 David D. Kirkpatrick, Conservatives See Court Shift as Culmination, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at A1; David D. Kirkpatrick, In Alito, G.O.P. Reaps Harvest 
Planted in ’82, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2006, at A1; and Adam Liptak, A Court Remade in 
the Reagan Era’s Image, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, at A19. 
28 NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 5-7 (2005) and JAMES A. MORONE, 
HELLFIRE NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN LIFE 453-90 (2003). 
29 Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Changing Room: The Court’s Dynamics Have 
a Way of Altering a Justice’s Approach to the Law, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 20, 2005, at 
B01. 
30 Professor Lawrence Tribe recently wrote a letter to Justice Breyer and his 
readers explaining that he was unable to continue work on the third edition of his 
influential treatise on constitutional law.  He explained that the number of cases decided 
by 5-4 votes “reflect a . . . fundamental and seemingly irreconcilable division within legal 
and popular culture that is not amenable to the treatment that a treatise might hope to give 
to such cases.”  Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 291, 302 (2005). 
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The counter-constitutional difficulty, 
the problem of constitutional theory, and democratizing judicial review 
In what has become the most famous of the Federalist Papers, James Madison 
argued that the new republic had a number of mechanisms that would alleviate the 
problem of faction that had undermined so many democracies throughout time.31  The 
solution was, in part, to entrench the Constitution from the channels of ordinary political 
change.  Majorities might rule when it came to political matters32 but a supermajority 
would be required to change the Constitution.33  Constitutions play a key role in 
facilitating democratic politics.  Democracies require the alternation in power between 
opposing groups.34  Competing groups or factions mistrust each other, however.  That 
mistrust is lessened if a constitution limits what a group may do once in power.  
Maintaining the distinction between constitutions and ordinary laws is critical for the 
longevity of democracy as constitutions protect the interests of those not in power.  The 
political stakes in gaining power rise and democracies become unstable when 
constitutions can be as readily changed as ordinary legislation.35   
This Article argues that the trust needed for democratic politics to function well is 
threatened by the recent appointments wars.  The stiff supermajority requirements built 
into Article V have been undermined by the constitutional politics facilitated by the rules 
governing judicial appointments.36  There is even less democratic protection built into the 
appointments process than in enacting legislation since the former requires only Senate 
approval.  As the battles during the current appointments season illustrate, presidents pay 
attention to factions that are important to their coalition and that care deeply about the 
ideology of who sits on the Court.  The counter-constitutional difficulty is that the 
struggle by social conservatives to place their partisans on the United States Supreme 
Court introduces the problem of faction into constitutional politics and renders hollow the 
protection afforded by Article V of the Constitution.   
Under the long intellectual shadow cast by Alexander Bickel, however, 
constitutional theory has paid little attention to the tension between the Supreme Court 
and the Constitution and focused instead on the tension between the Supreme Court and 
democratically elected legislatures.  The issue Bickel raised is how the power of a non-
elected branch of government to thwart the decisions of elected officials can be justified 
                                                 
31 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
32 “Might” is the operative word since, as Robert Dahl pointed out in his long 
critique of THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, majorities sometimes elect presidents but minorities 
have the key voice in interelection issues.  ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC 
THEORY 124-51 (1956).   
33 U.S. CONST. art. V.  
34 ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 16-41 (1971). 
35 Constitutions in Latin America, for example, were readily changed which 
contributed to breakdown of democracy in the region.  No group could trust the advent to 
power of another group if constitutions can be readily changed.  Constitutionalism in 
Latin America can be seen as a grand experiment in the consequences of making 
constitutions as easy to change as ordinary legislation.  Miguel Schor, Constitutionalism 
Through the Looking Glass of Latin America, 41 TEX. INT’L L. J. 1 (2006). 
36 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2. 
 7
in a democracy.37  Although Bickel raised the issue almost half a century ago, the 
countermajoritarian difficulty remains a vital issue in constitutional theory.38  As 
Professor Brown artfully describes Bickel’s legacy, at “Bickel’s instigation, contender 
after contender has stepped forward to try a hand at pulling the sword of judicial review 
from the stone of illegitimacy.”39   
The various solutions proposed by Bickel’s interlocutors to the 
countermajoritarian difficulty assume that the problem dissolves when the correct theory 
is crafted that explains when judicial review is an exercise in law rather than in politics.40  
The legal scholarship that has clustered around Bickel’s issue focuses, therefore, on the 
internal, cultural software that judges should be programmed with if judicial review is to 
be legitimate in a democracy.41  As a consequence of Bickel’s influence, less academic 
                                                 
37 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed., 1962). 
38 Barry Friedman’s seminal five part series as well as a recent major edited book 
illustrate the continuing salience of the countermajoritarian difficulty.  Barry Friedman, 
The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial 
Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); The History of the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, Part Two: Reconstruction’s Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1 (2002); The History 
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1383 (2001); The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's 
Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971 (2000); The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The 
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002); and 
THE JUDICIARY IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE 
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
(Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R. Castillo eds., 2005). 
39 Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COL. L. 
REV. 531, 531 (1998). 
40 STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO 
POLITICS 13-14 (1996) (arguing that American constitutionalism rests on an analogy 
between the constitution and ordinary law). 
41 The debate has splintered over whether the cultural understandings that inform 
judicial decision-making afford judges too much discretion when interpreting the 
Constitution.  Justice Scalia, for example, argues that the common law method of legal 
reasoning provides too much leeway for judges as it allows the Constitution to be 
interpreted according to current understandings of the text.  He argues that a more austere 
interpretive method is needed that examines the text of the Constitution in light of how its 
language was understood by the Framers if judicial review is to be compatible with 
democracy.  Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: the Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (1997).  Other scholars argue that 
the Constitution is an evolving document, that the text should be interpreted according to 
contemporary understandings, and that the common law method of reasoning sufficiently 
binds judicial discretion so that judicial review is compatible with democracy.  Thomas 
C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.  703 (1975); David 
A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 
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ink has been spilled on the problem of external controls of judicial review than has been 
on the problem of internal controls.  The problem of constitutional theory is that it paid 
too much attention to interpretive niceties while ignoring the problem of how courts 
should be made politically accountable.42  The problem of judicial review is not that it is 
countermajoritarian but that it is potentially counter-constitutional.   
Rather than explore how judges ought to interpret the Constitution, this Article 
will examine the external hardware of democratic checks on judicial review by 
comparing the American experience with that of other successful long-term democracies 
in Western Europe and Canada.  Part II of this Article examines why the American model 
of weak democratic checks on judicial review—lifetime tenure after nomination by the 
President and confirmation by a bare majority of the Senate—has not worked well.43  The 
appointments process for the Supreme Court has long been politicized but the influence 
that factions now play is a recent and troubling trend.  Long-term historical and 
institutional changes that transformed the Court into a powerful political institution have 
led to a political backlash as interest groups vie to influence nominations.  Presidents now 
understand that they can use nominations as a form of coinage to build support and help 
fashion factions.  Appointments battles have become part of the landscape of American 
constitutional battles.44 
The solution to an overly democratized nomination process lies paradoxically in 
democratizing judicial review by strengthening the tools by which citizens may hold 
courts politically accountable.  Parts III and IV discuss respectively how Western Europe 
and Canada learned from our experience with weak political accountability for judicial 
review to fashion different and stronger democratic constraints.  These polities rather 
understandably rejected the notion that there is a sharp division between law and politics 
and that a court construing the Constitution would be a court of law.  The American 
system of weak political controls over the judiciary was adopted because the founders 
mistrusted democracy and pinned their hopes on republican virtue.  The Supreme Court is 
                                                                                                                                                 
1717 (2003); and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999). 
42 As Professor Mark Graber argues, constitutional theory would be enriched if it 
took constitutional politics into account.  Mark A. Graber, Constitutional Politics and 
Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and Neglected Relationship, 27 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 309 (2002).  See also Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSPECTIVES ON 
POL. 261, 272 (2006) (arguing for the importance of interdisciplinary work between legal 
scholars and political scientists). 
43 There are, of course, other mechanisms that could be used to limit the power of 
the Supreme Court.  Professor Geyh explains that the emergence of a custom or a 
convention that judicial independence should be protected has prevented Congress from 
using the political tools in its arsenal, however.  CHARLES G. GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND 
CONGRESS COLLIDE 5-10 (forthcoming 2006).  As a consequence of the emergence of this 
convention, Congress today relies largely on the nomination process to control courts 
rather than impeachment, the budget, or jurisdiction.   
44 David S. Law & Sanford Levinson, Why Nuclear Disarmament May Be Easier 
to Achieve Than an End to Partisan Conflict Over Judicial Appointments, 39 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 923 (2005). 
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the vestigial remnant of an older notion of politics where only the few participated 
because only elites had the necessary virtue to govern.45  The framers, moreover, could 
not foresee the role that the Supreme Court would play in American politics.  If the 
framers made no explicit provision for judicial review in the Constitution, then a fortiori 
they did not give sustained thought to the problem of the accountability of the least 
dangerous branch.  The rest of the world chose a different path because of political 
learning.46  Other polities considered and rejected adopting American style judicial 
review with its weak democratic constraints because they learned from the American 
experience that constitutional courts are political as well as legal institutions.  Courts can 
be held politically accountable either ex ante by means of appointments or post facto by 
providing mechanisms for a democratic override of constitutional interpretations.47  The 
nations of Western Europe chose a different and more democratic political appointments 
process than the United States.48  By adopting supermajority appointments procedures, 
the European model of judicial review reduces the power of factions to influence 
constitutional interpretation.  Fearing the power of the American Supreme Court, Canada 
provides for the possibility of a legislative override of its Supreme Court.49  Factions are 
unlikely to choose the uncertain path of influencing appointments when they can seek a 
legislative override of constitutional interpretations. 
This Article argues that different models of judicial review should be judged not 
according to normative criteria but rather from a much different vantage point which is 
how alternative forms of judicial review structure politics.50  As Donald Kommers 
argues, comparative constitutional law “illuminate[s] the relationship between American 
courts and democracy.”51  Comparative constitutional law also opens the door to a 
different appreciation of our Constitution.  In an important new book, Sanford Levinson 
argues persuasively that a critical tradition is lacking in American constitutional 
thought.52  One can be committed to the goals of the Constitution contained in its 
                                                 
45 MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 
12-45 (1998).   
46 Polities constantly learn from the experience of other nations.  Political 
learning, for example, was an important factor in recent transitions to democracy.  
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY (1991). 
47 Other mechanisms to control courts include impeachment and control over 
jurisdiction.  These are seldom used in mature democracies because they invade judicial 
independence.  The threat of such constraints may make courts more politically 
accountable, however.  John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, 
Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (2002). 
48 See Part III infra. 
49 See Part IV infra.   
50 Daniel A. Farber, Judicial Review and Its Alternatives: an American Tale, 38 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 415 (2003). 
51 Donald P. Kommers, American Courts and Democracy: a Comparative 
Perspective, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH (Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2005). 
52 SANFORD LEVINSON, SAYING NO TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
(forthcoming __). 
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Preamble while thinking that many of its provisions have not withstood the test of time.  
Comparative analysis obviously has a key role to play in any critical understanding of the 
Constitution.53  The framers were men of exceptional talent but they quite obviously 
lacked the “knowledge that might be gained from later experience with democracy in 
America and elsewhere.”54  American exceptionalism when it comes to appointments has 
not served the United States well.  By democratizing judicial review, other polities have 
made courts more politically accountable and thereby reduced the power of factions to 
change the meaning of the Constitution. 
II. American Exceptionalism and Distrust 
The American Constitution has thus by and large remained a constitution properly 
so called, concerned with constitutive questions.  What has distinguished it, and 
indeed the United States itself, has been a process of government, not a governing 
ideology. . . . ‘As a charter of government a constitution must prescribe legitimate 
processes, not legitimate outcomes, if like ours (and unlike more ideological 
documents elsewhere) it is to serve many generations through changing times.’55 
There is considerable disagreement whether judicial review enhances or 
undermines democracy.  The most famous attempt to argue that judicial review promotes 
democracy is John Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust.56  Professor Ely sought to drive a 
stake in the heart of the countermajoritarian difficulty by arguing that the Supreme Court 
was not a deviant institution in a democracy.  The tension between democracy and the 
Supreme Court that lay at the root of Bickel’s problem dissolves when the Court acts as a 
referee that polices the mechanisms of democracy: 
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when (1) the ins are 
choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and 
the outs will stay out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a voice or vote, 
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representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically 
disadvantaging some minority.57   
The Warren Court was not, as Bickel suggested, a problem that constitutional theory had 
to surmount but rather provides an exemplary model of how the Court ought to function.  
Courts should, and the Warren Court did,58 take an “antitrust” rather than a “regulatory” 
approach to politics by protecting democratic participation rather than imposing 
substantive outcomes.  The Supreme Court, in short, engenders trust when it effectuates 
democratic participation.   
There is little doubt that Ely’s theory resonates deeply with core assumptions 
about courts and democracy.  Democracy is commonly defined in procedural terms as a 
set of rules for structuring political competition.59  Polities throughout the world adopted 
judicial review when they democratized because courts serve as “an alternative forum in 
which to challenge governmental action” and thereby provide a “form of insurance to 
prospective electoral losers during the constitutional bargain.”60  Polities throughout 
space and time have relied on courts to ameliorate conflict because it is universally 
recognized that the fairest means to deal with disagreement is to have a neutral third party 
resolve the matter.61  John Roberts invoked this universal logic in the opening statement 
of his nomination hearings when he argued that “[j]udges are like umpires” because 
“[u]mpires don’t make the rules, they apply them.” 62  Samuel Alito also based his 
opening statement on this logic: “A judge can’t have an agenda . . . and a judge certainly 
doesn’t have a client.  The judge’s only obligation—and it’s a solemn obligation—is to 
the rule of law.”63 
Although Ely’s theory is normatively attractive, it fails to realistically appraise 
either the work of the Warren Court or its impact on American politics.  The Warren 
Court was revolutionary because it articulated and protected substantive rights.64  
Although the founders built substantive commitments into the Constitution, the Supreme 
Court did not become serious about effectuating rights until the Constitutional Revolution 
of 1937.65  The post-1937 jurisprudence of the Court had a profound influence on 
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constitutional politics as factions or interest groups formed in response to the substantive 
rights articulated by the Court.  Political activity increasingly became oriented towards 
the judicial arena.  Interest groups sought to change the law by bringing test cases66 and 
by changing the membership of the Court.  As a consequence, Americans began to see 
themselves as the bearers of legally enforceable rights rather than as participants in a 
political process that would determine those rights.67   
The political activity awakened by the Warren Court illustrates that Ely was 
wrong to argue that nations are constituted solely by a commitment to legitimate 
processes.  Nations are “imagined communities” whose members do not know each other 
yet share important bonds.68  The American Revolution created a new model or template 
for building a nation by using a constitution, rather than language or ethnicity, to found a 
political community.  Professor Tushnet makes a critical contribution to our 
understanding of how the American nation was forged by arguing that there are two parts 
to the Constitution: one part regulates the government; the other speaks to who we are as 
a people.69  The substantive provisions played an important role in the political battles 
that shaped the nation.  From Dred Scott v. Sanford,70 to Lochner v. New York,71 to 
Brown v. Board of Education,72 to Roe v. Wade,73 the Supreme Court has never been the 
final word when speaking to the fundamental values that constitute the nation.  The 
argument that the “Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Constitution” ought to be 
“treated as having status equivalent to the Constitution itself” 74 has fortunately never had 
any purchase with either politicians or the public.   
The American Supreme Court is exceptional among the world’s supreme or 
constitutional courts because it has weak rules of political accountability.  Changing the 
constitution’s meaning by replacing its members is not an attractive political strategy in 
nations that follow either the European75 or Canadian models of judicial review.76  A core 
argument of this Article is that although supreme or constitutional courts throughout the 
world generate political controversy, it is unlikely that factions will form to transform the 
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constitution by having partisans appointed to supreme courts in other polities because 
they have stronger and more democratic rules of political accountability.  By 
democratizing judicial review, polities can avoid the faction strewn shoals of American 
judicial appointments.  The politicization of the appointments process in the United 
States, moreover, has eroded the legitimacy of the Supreme Court.  Courts can ameliorate 
political conflict only if they are perceived as neutral arbiters.  Religious conservatives 
have made it clear, however, that they will support only nominees with a clear ideological 
track record.  If the justices of the Court are identified with a political faction, the 
Supreme Court undermines rather than facilitates the trust needed for democracy to work.  
In short, the appointments wars have negative, long-term consequences for American 
democracy.   
A. Legal mobilization and constitutional politics 
Scholars disagree whether the appointments wars constitute something new in 
constitutional politics.  One view is that ideology has mattered since the founding of the 
republic.77  The opposing view is that the Reagan administration transformed judicial 
appointments by imposing an ideological litmus test for all nominations.78  There is little 
doubt that ideology and interest group mobilization play an unprecedented role in judicial 
appointments that increasingly look like elections.  The elite centered appointment 
struggles of the 19th and early 20th century have now become full fledged democratic 
brawls as the public has a place at the table.  Professor Davis, for example, concludes 
“The transformation of the Supreme Court appointment process into a mechanism similar 
to that of an electoral campaign has occurred because of the introduction of new, 
powerful players—the news media, interest groups, and public opinion.”79   
What is not well understood, however, are the historical and institutional 
processes that led citizens to mobilize to seek to transform the meaning of the 
Constitution by changing the membership of the Supreme Court.  The existing literature 
focuses on the political battles to shape the Court while largely ignoring the role the 
Court plays in mobilizing citizens.  Yet a review of the history of appointments struggles 
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in the United States demonstrates the role law plays in shaping the formation of interest 
groups that seek to change the law and the role that legal mobilization plays in 
transforming the law.80  Legal mobilization, in short, is both a consequence and a cause 
of constitutional change. 
Today’s democratic appointments battles are being fought on an institutional 
terrain that was not designed for public participation.  Although there was considerable 
disagreement at the Constitutional convention over how Supreme Court justices were to 
be appointed, the compromise that was reached made the President the primary player in 
the appointment process.81  Article II, section 2 of the Constitution provides that the 
President “shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint . . . judges of the Supreme Court.”  The president was made the key player in 
nominating justices because it was thought that he would be best able to select qualified 
individuals.82  The process was designed to be free of popular politics as neither the 
President nor the Senate were directly elected.  The framers did not and could not foresee 
that the Revolution would transform a hierarchical and deferential society where elites 
governed with little public participation into an egalitarian society.83  Appointments were 
designed to be an elite-centered process where virtue would trump interest.84 
The Appointments Clause was also designed for a very different constitutional 
universe than the one we inhabit today.  The modern view that the Supreme Court is an 
important policymaker was not shared by the founders.  The founders assumed that law 
was fixed and immutable and that change would occur only through the political 
processes.85  The constitutional assumptions that gave birth to Article II, section 2 of the 
Constitution are illustrated in a case that looms large in the constitutional imagination, 
Marbury v. Madison.86  Marbury was decided in the maelstrom of a political battle.  
Having lost control of the presidency and the legislature in the 1800 elections, the 
Federalists sought to retain power by packing the judiciary with their partisans.87  
Marbury was a disappointed Federalist nominee and his suit threatened to ignite a battle 
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between the Court and the President that John Marshall wanted to avoid.  Marshall 
successfully navigated the political shoals of the dispute, in part, by drawing a “line, 
which nearly all citizens of his time believed ought to be drawn, between the legal and 
the political—between those matters on which all Americans agreed and which therefore 
were fixed and immutable and those matters which were subject to fluctuation and 
change through democratic politics.”88  When Justice Marshall opined that Marbury’s 
right to the judicial commission was akin to a property right, Americans understood that 
these were rights that were to be preserved by courts against democratic processes.  
Marbury v. Madison was understood by contemporaries to be an important decision that 
“generate[d] [surprisingly] little controversy” because it rested on the “largely 
unarticulated” operative constitutional assumptions of the day.89 
Although the division between law and politics drawn by Marshall was largely 
unchallenged before the Civil War, many Supreme Court decisions did arouse political 
controversy.  The Marshall Court was a nationalist institution in an era when state 
loyalties were strong.  Its nationalist decisions led to “heated public controversy.”90  The 
opposition “ranged from outright defiance of judicial rulings to protests and memorials 
against Court action directed to Congress and other states.”91  This opposition, however, 
did not lead to a sustained challenge to the power of the Court.  The states were unable to 
ally and present a united front against the Court since opposition coalesced around 
individual decisions rather than the Court as an institution.  Popular control over the 
Court was largely a non-issue before the Civil War as the Court was considerably more 
limited in its powers and citizens were more prone to ignore its edicts.92   
The institutional seeds that would eventually facilitate the development of 
ideological popular warfare in judicial appointments were planted in the wake of the 
Civil War.93  The Court had an important new weapon in its arsenal as the Fourteenth 
Amendment provided important restrictions that could be enforced against the states.94  
The Due Process Clause furnished the Court with an institutional lever of power around 
which social forces would henceforth coalesce.  In addition, federal courts were provided 
with broader jurisdiction to “redirect civil litigation involving national commercial 
interests out of state courts and into the federal judiciary.”95  In short, federal courts now 
had sufficient power to elicit sustained popular opposition. 
The institutional transformations that occurred after the Civil War cannot be 
understood in a political and social vacuum.  Business interests were politically ascendant 
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and sought to use the courts to facilitate the development of a national economy.  In the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, constitutional politics revolved around the issue 
of government regulation of capitalism.  Economic growth transformed American society 
after the Civil War.96  Businesses changed from being primarily family run operations 
before 1870 to larger bureaucratic organizations that were able to fend of regulation by 
means of strategic litigation.97  The managers of these businesses “formed professional 
associations and networks of communications that allowed them to learn from each 
other.”98  The railroads, in particular, played a key role in shaping the contours of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  As the “first modern, interstate industry that intimately affected 
the economic interests of virtually all of American society,” there was considerable 
popular pressure to subject the railroads to regulation and they responded with a 
“systematic litigation campaign challenging the constitutional validity of government 
regulation in the courts.”99   
Attempts by business interests to shield themselves from regulation was met with 
popular opposition as “populists, progressives, and labor leaders subjected both state and 
federal courts to vigorous and persistent criticism and proposed numerous plans to 
abridge judicial power.”100  Popular forces mounted a two pronged attack on judicial 
power.  One prong was directed at weakening judicial power by scholars and politicians 
who questioned the propriety of judicial review.101  The other prong involved two 
attempts to derail Supreme Court nominations.  The first was by the National Grange 
which was a national organization that played an important role in influencing states to 
enact legislation regulating railroads.102  The Grange sought to further the goals of its 
members by becoming involved in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to defeat the 
appointment of Stanley Matthews, who as a Senator had been an important spokesman 
for the railroads.103  The Grange mounted a vigorous campaign against Matthews who 
was ultimately confirmed 24 to 23 in 1881.  The closeness of the vote is remarkable 
given that Senators were not directly elected.  The enactment of the Seventeenth 
Amendment in 1913 facilitated the second attempt by populist forces to derail a Supreme 
Court nomination.104  President Hoover’s nomination of Judge John Parker in 1930 
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aroused opposition by organized labor as well as by the NAACP.105  Parker’s nomination 
was defeated by a vote of 41 to 39.  The campaigns that revolved around the nominations 
of Stanley Matthews and John Parker are a clear harbinger of current appointment battles. 
The jurisprudence of the Lochner era, like that of the Marbury era, rested on 
largely unspoken assumptions as to the proper dividing line between law and politics.  
The Court sought to curtail legislative attempts to deal with the social ills created by 
capitalism by holding that it rested on constitutionally suspect factional politics.  
Professor Gillman writes “The judiciary’s persistent attachment to traditional limits on 
legislative power represented the final defense of a principle of constitutional legitimacy 
that the framers sought to permanently enshrine in fundamental law.”106  The framers 
sought to erect a neutral state that could not constitutionally enact legislation favoring 
factions.  The “master principle” of the Constitution, as articulated in the Federalist No. 
10, was that “[G]ood republican government required institutional structures that were 
popular yet still divorced from the corrupting influence of ‘factions,’ defined by Madison 
. . . as a number of citizens, majority or minority, united by some common passion or 
interest (usually arising out of ‘the various and unequal distribution of property’) that was 
adverse to the ‘permanent and aggregate interests of the community.’”107  In short, the 
Court sought to protect a vision of democratic politics where legislatures could not enact 
legislation that would protect or favor interest groups.   
The popular opposition that arose to Lochner and its progeny exposes how 
constitutional fault lines are constructed.  The strategic use of the constitution by 
conservative interest groups came at a price which was the politicization of judicial 
review.  The original understanding that judicial review was an apolitical exercise 
collapsed when the Court clashed with important political currents: “In deciding . . .  to 
protect property rights and individual economic liberty at the expense of those who were 
using legislative power to promote their vision of a just and good society, judges were 
seen by progressive reformers to be engaging in a fundamentally different activity than 
which John Marshall had engaged in when his Court, early in the nineteenth century, had 
commenced the judiciary’s protection of property.”108  The Court’s attempt to effectuate 
an interest free democratic politics became untenable once it was perceived that the Court 
was allied with business interests that sought to entrench their policy preferences from 
the channels of ordinary political change.109  The Lochner era illustrates that attempts to 
use the Constitution by factions to protect their interests from politics can arouse a 
popular counter-mobilization that shifts the battle from the legislative to the 
constitutional arena. 
The judicial effort to protect property rights broadly construed against popular 
political forces collapsed in what has become known as the Constitutional Revolution of 
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1937.110  The government sought to use its regulatory and spending powers to alleviate 
the ills caused by the Depression.111  From 1935 to 1936, however, the Supreme Court 
held fast to the old dividing line between law and politics when it derailed many New 
Deal initiatives.  Franklin Roosevelt understood that he would have to do battle with the 
Supreme Court to fashion a vigorous federal response to the Depression.112  He 
considered but rejected a constitutional amendment as too difficult politically and too 
uncertain as any amendment would be interpreted by the Court.113  Instead, Roosevelt 
proposed a plan to increase the membership of the Court.114  Although Roosevelt failed in 
his bid to entrench his partisans on the Court, the Court changed course.115  The Supreme 
Court announced that henceforth it would provide only cursory review of economic rights 
while conducting a more searching review of individual liberties.116  By deciding on a 
court packing plan, Roosevelt fashioned an important precedent in constitutional politics.  
The rigors of Article V meant that henceforth those seeking constitutional change would 
look to the appointments process as the only viable vehicle to achieve their aims. 
The scholarship that revolves around the import of the Constitutional Revolution 
of 1937 focuses on the highly visible doctrinal changes that occurred in its wake while 
ignoring the more important but subterranean transformations that occurred in the 
linkages between the people and the Court.  The rights revolution involved legal and 
social transformations.  Economic growth played an important role in fueling the rights 
revolution as it provided the wherewithal for a number of players, not just primarily 
business actors as had been true in the second half of the nineteenth century, to 
participate in and fund interest group activity aimed at constitutional litigation.117  The 
judicial protection of rights, moreover, would not have been possible without the 
involvement of citizens who were willing to mobilize to fashion and effectuate rights.118  
A new model of citizenship arose as citizens increasingly became seen as the bearers of 
constitutionally protected rights.119  The civil rights movement, in particular, “provided a 
model and inspiration for a wide variety of new social movements and political 
organizations” and helped fix a “rights-centered citizenship at the center of American 
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civil aspiration.”120  The broad guarantees contained in the Constitution were effectuated 
not simply from above by the Supreme Court but also from below by the thickening of 
interest group activity that supported a broad array of constitutional litigation.121  The 
doctrinal constitutional rights revolution, in short, both facilitated and was supported by 
legal mobilization. 
The Constitutional Revolution of 1937 also looms large in scholarly attempts to 
understand efforts by conservatives to transform the meaning of the Constitution.  In 
Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,122 Professors Jack Balkin and Sanford 
Levinson argue that the conservative turn of the Supreme Court can best be explained by 
a theory of “partisan entrenchment.”123  The theory posits that constitutional politics is no 
different today than in F.D.R.’s day because the Court ultimately reflects popular opinion 
through the process of judicial appointments.124  Constitutional change occurs through 
judicial interpretation as Presidents seek to change the meaning of the Constitution by 
placing their partisans on the Supreme Court.  The theory of partisan entrenchment very 
usefully highlights the role that battles over appointments play in transforming the 
Constitution.  This Article argues, however, that current conservative attempts to change 
the membership of the Court are not simply constitutional politics as usual for three 
reasons.  First, the bureaucratic capacity to identify ideological appointees has improved 
markedly since F.D.R. was president.  Second, the conservative turn in the Court is not 
simply a reflection of majoritarian views but rather reflect the views of influential 
factions within the Republican coalition that have intense preferences over judicial 
appointments.  Third, current appointments battles have negative implications for the 
long-term health of American democracy. 
The problem with theories that seek to build on the lessons of F.D.R.’s court 
packing plan to understand attempts by conservatives to transform the Court is that the 
analogy is flawed.  Ronald Reagan, much like F.D.R., came into office critical of a 
number of Supreme Court decisions and determined to transform the Constitution by 
changing the membership of the Court.  Ronald Reagan, however, had in place a 
bureaucratic apparatus which previous presidents lacked that enabled his administration 
to thoroughly vet the ideology of his nominees.125  The Reagan Justice Department 
through the Office of Legal Policy articulated a view of the Constitution in a series of 
reports that was strikingly critical of existing doctrine.126  The Office of Legal Policy also 
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emphasized the importance of judicial ideology in seeking to transform the 
Constitution.127  The Reagan administration established ideological criteria for judicial 
nominations and then searched for nominees who complied with those criteria.  Professor 
Yalof concludes that the examination by the administration of the ideological view of 
potential Supreme Court nominees was unprecedented.128   
Partisan entrenchment by the Reagan and subsequent conservative administrations 
was not simply a result of presidential politics.  The modern conservative movement 
arose in direct response to judicial decisions that directly challenged many core 
conservative beliefs.129  It is no accident that “[b]attles over abortion, birth control, the 
Equal Rights Amendment, and other gender-based issues (and, more recently, battles 
over homosexuality) have mobilized the fundamentalist right more successfully and 
energetically than any other issues.”130  As Professor Feldman notes, we are a nation 
divided over issues that “go to the very heart of who we are as a nation.”131  Perhaps no 
modern constitutional case played a more important role in dividing the nation along 
lines of supposed good and evil than Roe v. Wade.  Roe “infuriated a lightly sleeping 
giant,” 132 by energizing a conservative movement that sees the opinion as the moral 
equivalent of Dred Scott.  Since the policies that social conservatives wish to change are 
embedded in the Constitution primarily by means of judicial interpretation, the solution is 
to change the make-up of the federal courts.  The interest group activity that played a 
crucial role in the appointments of John Roberts and Samuel Alito illustrates how 
factions can form to change the path of the Court.  Constitutional change occurs not only 
as a result of pressure from above as presidents seek to transform the meaning of the 
Constitution but also as a result of pressure from below as interest groups coalesce to 
change the path of the Court.  In short, the substantive decisions of the Court facilitated 
the rise of a conservative counter-mobilization that seeks to transform the meaning of the 
Constitution by appointing conservative partisans on the Supreme Court. 
The appointments wars have long-term, negative consequences for American 
democracy.  Public support for the Court has eroded.133  Courts can play a role in 
                                                                                                                                                 
creating rights not properly found in the constitutional text or structure or original intent 
of the framers, such as the right to privacy and the rights of criminal suspects.”) 
127 Id. at 397 (A report entitled “The Constitution in the Year 2000: Choices 
Ahead in Constitutional Interpretation” noted “’There are few factors that are more 
critical to determining the course of the Nation, and yet more often overlooked, than the 
values and philosophies of the men and women who populate the third co-equal branch of 
the national government—the federal judiciary.’”) 
128 YALOF, supra note __, at 144. 
129 NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD (2005) and MORONE, supra note __. 
130 BRINKLEY, supra note __, at 291.   
131 Id. at 7. 
132 N.E.H. HULL & PETER CHARLES HOFFER, ROE V. WADE: THE ABORTION 
RIGHTS CONTROVERSY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 187 (2001). 
133 A recent survey shows that more than half of Americans are “angry and 
disappointed with the nation’s judiciary” and that a “majority of the survey respondents 
agreed with statements that ‘judicial activism’ has reached a crisis stage, and that judges 
who ignore voters’ values should be impeached.”  Martha Neil, Half of U.S. Sees Judicial 
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ameliorating political conflict only if they are perceived to be independent of ideological 
and social forces.  E.P. Thompson in his classic Whigs and Hunters notes “If the law is 
evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimize nothing. . . . The 
essential precondition for the effectiveness of law . . . is that it shall display an 
independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to be just.”134  Democracies 
require alternation in power by opposing factions.  Constitutions play an important role in 
facilitating regular turnover in power as the losing side knows that there are limits to 
what the party in power can do.  If, however, one faction can entrench its partisans in the 
judicial system, then politics becomes polarized as the Constitution no longer moderates 
but exacerbates conflict.135  American exceptionalism when it comes to appointments has 
fueled distrust. 
Although a vigorous debate is currently underway among scholars over reforming 
judicial appointments,136 the debate is unlikely to bear fruit given the roadblocks to 
reform.137  Other polities have powerful constitutional courts yet have managed to avoid 
the appointments battles that plague the United States.  The nations of continental 
Europe, for example, largely require a supermajority for appointment to national high 
courts.138  Canada allows for temporary legislative overrides of Supreme Court 
decisions.139  The comparative experience shows the importance of democratizing 
                                                                                                                                                 
Activism Crisis, __ A.B.A. J. __ (Sept. 30, 2005).  Another important survey shows that 
the Supreme Court’s “public image has eroded significantly.”  The Court has lost support 
among Democrats who are unhappy over Bush v. Gore and among Republicans “who 
want the court to take a tougher stand against abortion rights.”  The Pew Research Center 
for the People and the Press, Supreme Court's Image Declines as Nomination Battle 
Looms: Court Critics Now on Both Left and Right, June 15, 2005, http://people-
press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=247.   
134 E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT 263 
(1975).   
135 Political conflict in Latin America, for example, has been exacerbated by the 
ease with which constitutions were manipulated by social forces.  Miguel Schor, 
Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass of Latin America, 41 TEX. INT’L L. J. 1 
(2006). 
136 The scholarship on reforming judicial appointments overwhelmingly focuses 
on the problem of life-time tenure rather than the advisability of super-majoritarian 
appointment mechanisms.  See, e.g., REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICES (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006).  The problem, 
however, is not how to make a Supreme Court more responsive to democratic pressures, 
which ending life tenure would certainly do, but rather in fashioning a court that is both 
responsive to the will of the vast majority of Americans while sufficiently independent to 
retain legitimacy.  Super-majority appointment provisions attack this problem more 
directly than do term limits for Supreme Court Justices. 
137 David S. Law & Sanford Levinson, Why Nuclear Disarmament May Be Easier 
to Achieve Than an End to Partisan Conflict Over Judicial Appointments, 39 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 923 (2005). 
138 See Part III infra.   
139 See Part IV infra.   
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judicial review by creating institutional mechanisms that make it impossible or unlikely 
that factions will seek to transform the constitution by influencing appointments.  
American constitutional theory, on the other hand, has turned not to institutional 
mechanisms in seeking to curb the Court but to popular constitutionalism. 
III. Ex Ante Popular Controls over the Constitution 
For all the disagreement about what we mean by ‘republic,’ no one has ever 
doubted that self-government is its essence and a constitution the purest distillate.  
What kind of republic removes its constitution from the process of self-
governing?  Certainly not the one our Founders gave us.  Is it one we prefer?  The 
choice, after all, is ours.  The Supreme Court has made its grab for power.  The 
question is: will we let them get away with it?140 
Power grabs understandably elicit scholarly attention.  The revolutionary 
transformations wrought by the Warren Court provided considerable and unprecedented 
grist for the constitutional theory mill.  Scholars sought to reconcile the jurisprudence of 
the Warren Court with the belief that the Supreme Court must be a legal, rather than a 
political, institution if it were to retain legitimacy.  Both Bickel’s The Least Dangerous 
Branch and Ely’s Democracy and Distrust, for example, sought to spin out normative 
theories that justified the work of the Warren Court as a legal institution.  Constitutional 
theory posited that courts had the capacity to act in a principled fashion that other 
political actors lacked.141  Constitutional theory did not take constitutional politics into 
account in seeking to understand or legitimate the work of the Warren Court.   
Constitutional theory faced a different set of challenges with the Rehnquist Court.  
Legal academics largely did not approve of the Rehnquist Court142 which was obviously 
more conservative and, somewhat less obviously, more activist than the Warren Court.143  
More importantly, a transformation occurred in the criticism levied at the Supreme Court.  
The bedrock assumption that the right normative theory could cabin the Court’s 
discretion had been shattered.144  Conservative mistrust of liberal judicial activism that 
                                                 
140 Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term, Foreword: We the Court, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 169 (2001). 
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LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000).  The 
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invalidating federal statutes as it sought to trim the sails of Congress and resurrect the 
power of states.  THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: 
THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM (2004).  
144 An article by perhaps the most famous federal judge currently sitting on the 
bench in one of the leading American law reviews that the Supreme Court is a political 
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grew in response to the Warren Court was now joined by liberal mistrust of conservative 
judicial activism in response to the Rehnquist Court.145  As a result, normative theories 
that place the Supreme Court at the center of the constitutional pantheon must now 
contend with more radical and populist critiques that aim at dethroning the Court as the 
supreme interpreter of the Constitution.  These theories rest on the assumption that if law 
does not limit judicial discretion, then perhaps politics can.  Constitutional theory which 
once overwhelmingly stressed how judges ought to interpret the law has important new 
offshoots that look to the role that we the people might play in constraining judicial 
discretion.146  Constitutional theory, in short, no longer ignores the role of constitutional 
politics. 
Larry Kramer is a forceful exponent of the need to curtail the power of the 
Supreme Court.  In The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial 
Review,147 Larry Kramer argues that the founding generation had a very different 
understanding of the Constitution than the one we hold today.  The original 
understanding was that the people made the Constitution and, contrary to modern 
                                                                                                                                                 
institution would have been unthinkable four decades ago when the Warren Court was in 
its heyday.  Judge Richard Posner’s foreword to the Court’s 2004 term marks an 
important shift in the thinking of lawyers and legal academics as it argues that the Court 
is a political institution.  Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term, Foreword: A 
Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005).  Posner’s claim is a matter of dispute 
among lawyers and legal academics even though it is a matter of bedrock faith for 
political scientists.   
145 Although liberals have criticized a number of Rehnquist Court decisions, Bush 
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), obviously cemented liberal mistrust of the Rehnquist Court.  
See, e.g., Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 
87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1049-50 (2001) (arguing that the decision amounted to a 
“constitutional coup” in which “[f]ive members of the United States Supreme Court, 
confident in their power, and brazen in their authority, engaged in flagrant judicial 
misconduct that undermined the foundations of constitutional government”). 
146 This nascent shift in constitutional theory is mirrored by an analogous 
transformation in views by political scientists about the Supreme Court.  The once 
prevailing orthodoxy eschewed law as a mechanism for limiting discretion and argued 
that ideology determines how judges voted.  JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).  The attitudinal model rests 
on an assumption that once united constitutional theory which is that one can explain the 
Supreme Court without taking its environment into account.  More recent political 
science accounts of the Supreme Court, much like the newer strands of constitutional 
theory, seek to contextualize the Court by looking at the role of other actors and at 
history.  LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (arguing that 
the justices act strategically by taking the preferences of other actors into account when 
rendering decisions) and Rogers Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the ‘New 
Institutionalism,’ and the Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89 (1988) 
(arguing that the values that shape judicial preferences are historically constructed). 
147 LARRY K. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).   
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practice, also maintained and interpreted it.  Fundamental law was popular law because it 
rested on consent and immemorial custom.  It could be changed only by revolution and 
by the slow accretion of social change.  The “idea of turning [any part of] this 
responsibility over to judges was simply unthinkable.”148  Modern legal commentators, 
on the other hand, argue that Framers sought to “create a self-correcting system of checks 
and balances whose fundamental operations could all take place from within the 
government itself, with minimal involvement or interference from the people.”149  The 
modern view divorces politics from law by entrusting the maintenance of the Constitution 
to the Supreme Court rather than to the people.  Kramer believes that the modern view 
has debilitated the citizenry and exacerbated political conflict.  He concludes that the 
problems currently afflicting American democracy would be alleviated if the people were 
brought back into the mainstream of constitutional maintenance and interpretation, 
thereby recovering the lost Arcadian world of the founders. 
An important and negative consequence of the displacement of the people by the 
Court is the increased politicization of the nomination process.  Appointments 
increasingly matter as the Court has become the last and the supreme word on the 
meaning of the Constitution.  Other polities, Kramer argues, have solved the problem of 
democratic debilitation by adopting a different form of judicial review: 
 
The nations of modern Europe have found more sensible ways to handle this 
problem of control. . . . Appointments to the bench . . .  typically require a 
supermajority . . . guaranteeing that constitutional courts have a mainstream 
ideology, while judges serve terms that are limited and staggered to ensure a 
regular turnover.  In addition, the constitutions themselves are more easily 
amended than ours.  The combined effect of these innovations is to relieve the 
pressure a doctrine of supremacy creates by reducing the likelihood of serious 
breaches between the constitutional court and the other branches of government, 
and by making political correctives easier to implement when breaches occur.150  
While Kramer is right that the European model of judicial review makes 
important improvements on the American model, his analysis of what is flawed with 
American constitutionalism is wrong.  The Supreme Court’s assertion of supremacy did 
not debilitate the people but mobilized them to seek to place their partisans on the Court.  
Social conservatives have strong views on what the Constitution means and do not 
supinely accept constitutional decisions they believe are wrong.  The problem is that a 
mobilized citizenry can erode judicial independence.  Courts can ameliorate political 
conflict only if they are perceived as neutral arbiters.  A judiciary that is seen as 
accountable to a political faction, on the other hand, lacks legitimacy.151  American 
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exceptionalism in judicial appointments undermines constitutionalism by shrinking the 
distance between the people and the institutions of governance.152   
European constitutionalism works because appointment rules structure 
constitutional politics differently not because European nations have virtuous citizens that 
behave like the ideal of the founding generation.  Factions cannot seek to change 
constitutions by changing the personnel of national high courts because a supermajority is 
typically required to appoint constitutional judges.  European constitutionalism has 
different ex ante popular controls of the constitution than does the United States because 
European constitutionalism rests on very different assumptions.  The appointment rules 
for the American Supreme Court were crafted in the late eighteenth century when the 
power that the Court would one day wield was unimaginable.  When the nations of 
continental Europe created constitutional courts in the wake of World War II, on the 
other hand, there was no doubt, as richly evidenced by the history of the United States 
Supreme Court, that a court with the authority to interpret a constitution was a powerful 
political actor. 
The European model of judicial review 
Europe could not simply graft American style judicial review in constructing 
constitutional judicial review after World War II153 for two reasons.  First, the intellectual 
environment of late twentieth century Europe was profoundly different than that of late 
eighteenth century America.  The framers of the American constitution assumed that 
there was a clear delineation between law and politics and that the new Supreme Court 
would, therefore, be a court of law.154  After more than a century of American experience 
with judicial review, it was clear to Europeans that the American Supreme Court was not 
simply a legal institution but a political one as well.155  Second, the nations of continental 
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Europe had a tradition of parliamentary sovereignty that was difficult to reconcile with 
judicial review.156  Legislatures, not courts, were supreme in interpreting the constitution.  
As a consequence, the strong form of American judicial review with its correspondingly 
weak provisions for political accountability was unacceptable.157  These two factors led 
Europeans to devise a different form of judicial review that acknowledges its political 
nature by providing stronger democratic checks. 
Although constitutional judicial review would not be adopted in Europe until after 
World War II, an important debate occurred in the first half of the twentieth century.  A 
number of French public law scholars argued that American style judicial review should 
be adopted.158  This intellectual movement criticized the “traditional [understanding of 
the] separation of powers” and its “prohibition against judicial review.”159  These 
scholars believed that adopting judicial review was the key to ensuring the supremacy of 
the constitution over ordinary legislation.  The attempt to graft judicial review was 
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challenged, however, by scholars who criticized the American Supreme Court for 
blocking social legislation by a “restrictive reading of the due process clause.”160  
Lochner was a powerful anti-model161 for forces opposed to the adoption of American 
style judicial review.  The scholars who challenged the adoption of judicial review 
succeeded in “destroying whatever effective political support existed within 
parliament.”162   
While the debate over adopting American style judicial review was vigorously 
being waged in France during the first half of the twentieth century, the intellectual 
groundwork for a different form of judicial review was being crafted in Austria by Hans 
Kelsen.163  He understood that judicial review in Europe would have to take a different 
form than in the United States so that it could please two groups that were at loggerheads: 
“politicians suspicious of the judiciary and judicial power, and a pan-European 
movement of prominent legal scholars who favored installing American judicial review 
on the Continent.”164  Kelsen proposed that judicial review be exercised by a specialized 
body, a constitutional court, with carefully circumscribed powers.  He argued that a court 
with the power to invalidate legislation because it contravened the constitution exercised 
political as well as lawmaking authority.165  To limit this potentially dangerous delegation 
of power, Kelsen distinguished between negative and positive lawmaking.  The latter was 
the province of the legislator, the former of judges.  Kelsen believed the distinction 
between negative and positive lawmaking could be maintained if constitutions did not 
contain human rights due to their open-ended nature.  Kelsen also argued that judicial 
review should be exercised by specialized constitutional courts whose members were 
selected by politicians.  Kelsen “thought that a constitutional court ha[d] to be a special 
kind of court because constitutional law was a special kind of law.”166  He also argued 
that constitutional courts should review legislation before it was promulgated “thus 
preserving the sovereign character of statute[s] within the legal system.”167   
Kelsen’s ideas proved very influential in the construction of judicial review in 
Europe after World War II.  The desire to deal with the legacies of human rights 
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violations led to the creation of specialized constitutional courts.168  The European model 
of judicial review differs from American style of judicial review along three 
dimensions.169  First, the European model provides one court, a constitutional court, with 
a monopoly over constitutional adjudication.170  Judicial review is centralized in the 
Europe whereas it is diffuse in the United States.171  Given Europe’s long tradition of 
parliamentary supremacy, a specialized court that was empowered to deal with 
constitutional issues was needed as a counterweight.172  The ordinary courts in Europe 
lacked the independence and prestige to be able to effectively check parliament.173  
Second, judicial review in Europe is abstract whereas it is concrete in the United 
States.174  Review is abstract in Europe because statutes may be challenged before they 
are promulgated.  Review is concrete in the United States because courts may hear only 
cases or controversies.175  Professor Stone Sweet writes “European constitutional courts 
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were designed as relatively pure oracles of constitutional law.”176  Third, the appointment 
procedures differ and appointments have term limits.177  The United States has a 
majoritarian appointment process whereas the nations of Europe typically have a 
supermajoritarian process.178  An important consequence that flows from requiring a 
supermajority for appointment is that judges are more broadly representative of a polity’s 
culture and ideals.179   
There is considerable disagreement in the literature whether these differences 
matter.  One view focuses on the substantive divergences between European and 
American constitutionalism.180  In a number of substantive areas such as freedom of 
speech,181 the protection of human dignity,182 the protective function of the state,183 and 
                                                 
176 Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review and Why it 
May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2744, 2771 (2003). 
177 Lee Epstein et al., Comparing Judicial Selection Systems, 10 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 7, 12 (2001) (noting that democracies with constitutional courts rejected the 
American model in selecting and retaining judges because they sought to “maximize 
accountability”) and John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: 
Lessons from Europe, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1671, 1681 (2004).   
178 France is an important exception.  The French Constitutional Council (“FCC”) 
consists of nine members.  Its members are appointed by the President of the Republic, 
the President of the Senate, or the President of the National Assembly.  Each of these 
three elected officials appoints one member every three years for a nonrenewable term of 
nine years.  JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW __ (1992).   
179 Donald P. Kommers, American Courts and Democracy: a Comparative 
Perspective, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 200, 214 (Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire 
eds., 2005). 
180 George Nolte, Introduction—European and U.S. Constitutionalism: 
Comparing Essential Elements, in EUROPEAN AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM 9 (G. Nolte 
ed., 2005). 
181 The United States, for example, protects hate speech whereas Europe does not.  
Frederick Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication in Europe and the United States: 
A Case Study in Comparative Constitutional Architecture, in EUROPEAN AND U.S. 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 47 (G. Nolte ed., 2005). 
182 The term human dignity is of fairly recent constitutional vintage and can be 
found in a number of post-war European constitutions but not in the American 
constitution.  The phrase was adopted to deal in a more direct way with the atrocities of 
the Nazi regime than could be done under the general rubric of due process of law or the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  Giovanni 
Bognetti, The Concept of Human Dignity in European and U.S. Constitutionalism, in 
EUROPEAN AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM 75 (G. Nolte ed., 2005). 
183 The United States has resisted implying a positive duty on the part of the state.  
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195 
(1989) (the due process clause is not a “guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and 
security.”)  The differing European attitude can be seen most markedly in the famous 
German abortion decision reasoning that the right to life required the state to use the 
criminal law protect the foetus.  Abortion I, translated in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE 
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the role of international factors in domestic constitutionalism,184 European 
constitutionalism clearly differs from American constitutionalism.  A contrary view 
argues that “despite obvious differences between American and European systems of 
review, there is an increasing convergence in how review actually operates.”185  Professor 
Stone Sweet concludes that the United States Supreme Court is becoming specialized in 
constitutional law like its constitutional court counterparts in Europe whereas European 
abstract review is becoming more concrete.   
The difficulty in comparing European and American constitutionalism is that the 
obvious differences such as specialized courts exercising abstract review matter less than 
the differing appointments mechanisms.  Professor Michel Rosenfeld notes that the 
abstract nature of judicial review makes judicial review look more openly political than 
does the concrete review exercised in the United States yet “American constitutional 
adjudication has been attacked much more vehemently for being unduly political than its 
European counterpart.”186  Europe transformed judicial review in the process of adopting 
it by democratizing an inherently non-democratic institution.  Constitutional review has 
proven less problematic in Europe than in the United States in large part because 
supermajority provisions ensure that there is less ideological polarization on European 
constitutional courts than on the United States Supreme Court.  European courts can and 
do issue decisions that lead to a political backlash.  What cannot readily occur, however, 
is the rise of a sustained social movement whose primary objective is to transform the 
constitution by changing the membership of a nation’s high court.  Such a goal would be 
difficult given supermajority appointment provisions and also would make no sense 
given that European constitutions are easier to amend than the American constitution.187  
Strengthening ex ante controls over judicial review, however, is not the only mechanism 
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by which the people can be empowered to exercise control over their Constitution.  
Canada provides an example of how post facto controls may diminish the power of 
factions by democratizing judicial review. 
IV. Post Facto Popular Controls over the Constitution 
Some think that the Supreme Court’s elaboration of constitutional law has given 
us a rich vocabulary of practical political philosophy.  It has not.  It may have 
given the Supreme Court and some constitutional lawyers such a vocabulary. . . . 
The Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution give all of 
us that opportunity.  Perhaps it is time for us to reclaim it from the courts.188 
A constitution is, as Karl Llewellyn once remarked, a “peculiar institution” 
because it involves a way of “living and doing” of “well-nigh the whole population.”189  
The existence of shared attitudes “toward the verbal symbol Constitution and toward any 
person supposed to be attacking it”190 is crucial if constitutions are to limit power.  The 
court of public opinion, not a court of law, is the primary mechanism for enforcing 
constitutions.191  Courts cannot limit power if citizens are unwilling to mobilize when 
constitutional guarantees are violated.192  The question then is the role that courts play in 
constructing and maintaining the attitudes needed to sustain constitutional democracy. 
Popular constitutionalism is an intellectual project that posits a deep tension 
between the attitudes and beliefs needed to sustain constitutional democracy and judicial 
review.193  Kramer, for example, believes that the attitudes once shared by the virtuous 
citizens of the Republic have been eroded by judicial supremacy.  Mark Tushnet shares 
with Kramer the view that judicial review undermines the attitudes needed to sustain 
democracy but Tushnet’s criticism runs deeper than Kramer.  In Taking the Constitution 
Away from the Courts,194 Tushnet aims at doing away with judicial review, not just 
judicial supremacy, in construing the Constitution.  Judicial review, he argues “amounts 
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to noise around zero” because it “offers essentially random changes, sometimes good and 
sometimes bad, to what the political system produces.”195   
Tushnet’s attack on judicial review is based on the distinction he makes between 
the thin and the thick constitution.  The thin constitution consists of the principles 
embedded in the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution that 
constitute the nation.  The thick constitution, on the other hand, consists of the detailed 
provisions that organize the government.  The provisions of the thick constitution are 
important but they neither “generate” passion nor adherence to the Constitution.196  The 
people can be “committed to the thin Constitution in ways they could never be committed 
to the thick Constitution.”197  The problem with judicial review is that the public learns to 
leave important issues to the courts thereby eroding public discussion and adherence to 
the thin constitution.  He concludes his attack on judicial review by suggesting that 
perhaps we need an amendment precluding courts from construing the constitution.198  
By doing away with judicial review, Tushnet seeks to make space for the people to 
discuss the “Constitution’s meaning . . . in the ordinary venues for political 
discussion.”199   
In seeking to take the constitution away from the courts, Tushnet fails to 
appreciate why democracies choose to provide judicial protection of rights.  Rights that 
are embedded in politics, but not the law, as Tushnet urges, can be effectuated only 
through electoral channels.  The problem with relying solely on elections to effectuate 
rights is that there are a number of roadblocks to collective action.  Polities throughout 
the world have adopted judicially enforceable constitutional guarantees because they 
allow individuals to effectuate their rights at a lower cost than having to seek political 
vindication of such rights.  Legalizing rights, moreover, does not debilitate democracy as 
Tushnet argues.  The law is a democratic form of policymaking because it relies on 
citizens filing suits.200  Courts cannot effectuate rights without a stream of litigation.  The 
real problem in constitutional engineering, therefore, is to find a balance between politics 
and law so that courts do not gain mastery over the constitution at the expense of the 
people.  A more effective means for taking the constitution away from the courts—one 
that respects the political economy of rights—is provided by Canada’s post facto popular 
control of constitutionalism.   
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The Canadian model of judicial review 
The question popular constitutionalism wrestles with is how the dictates of a 
constitution can best be made effective.  There were historically two answers to that 
question: politics or law.201  The former is the Westminster model of parliamentary 
supremacy; the latter the American system of judicial review.  The Westminster model, 
which was once the dominant model among the world’s more stable democracies, no 
longer exists in its pure form.202  The nations of continental European adopted judicial 
review in the wake of the Second World War.  They rejected the American strong form 
of judicial review and democratized the practice by adopting supermajoritian 
appointment procedures.203  The last set of stable democracies to adopt judicial review 
were the nations of the British commonwealth but they too rejected the pure American 
model since they give courts the first, but not the last word, in exercising judicial 
review.204  Democracy may not have conquered the world but judicial review, in some 
form or other, has conquered democracy.  Popular constitutionalism is swimming against 
a worldwide historical current. 
The Canadian model of judicial review demonstrates that judicial review need not 
be joined at the hip with judicial supremacy even if that line has been blurred by 
American courts.205  The conclusion reached by the United States Supreme Court that 
courts must have the last word in construing the Constitution lest constitutional 
supremacy by undermined has been rejected by Canada.  Section 33 of the Canadian 
Constitution provides: 
Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of 
Parliament or of the legislature . . . that the Act or a provision thereof shall 
operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of 
this Charter.206 
Section 33, or the notwithstanding clause, seeks to bridge the divide between British 
practice of politicizing the enforcement of rights and the American practice of 
judicializing the enforcement of rights.  It has been reviled and praised by Canadian 
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politicians207 as well as scholars who dispute how well it comports with Canadian 
democracy.208  Section 33 has also become an important topic in comparative 
constitutional theory as scholars disagree whether it marks a new form of judicial 
review.209   
The origins of Section 33 can be found in section 2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights 
(“CBOR”) of 1960.210  CBOR, however, was a statutory bill of rights and had little 
impact because the courts “viewed their power through the traditional lens of 
parliamentary supremacy.211  Unhappiness with CBOR’s lack of effectiveness provided 
the impetus for the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.212  Pierre Trudeau initiated the 
process that would eventually culminate in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
when he was elected Prime Minister in 1968.  In the final negotiations that led to the 
adoption of the Charter, there was considerable opposition on the part of the provinces to 
a constitutionalized and entrenched bill of rights.213  Professor Weiler notes “The source 
of the provincial leaders’ concern was the same as the source of the Charter’s popular 
attraction: observation of Canada’s next-door neighbor’s two centuries of experience with 
constitutionalized rights.”214  Section 33, or the notwithstanding clause, was adopted as 
the result of a last minute compromise that made possible the adoption of the Canadian 
                                                 
207 Rainer Knopff & Andrew Banfield, “It’s the Charter Stupid!” Electoral 
Politics and the Supreme Court, http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2005/Banfield.pdf (June 
2, 2005).   
208 Compare Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between 
Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After 
All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 75 (1997) with CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, JUDICIAL POWER 
AND THE CHARTER: CANADA AND THE PARADOX OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (2d ed. 
2001). 
209 Compare Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of 
Rights- and Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813, 815 (2003) with 
Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 707 (2001).   
210 Gardbaum, supra note __, at 719-20.  Section 2 was designed to reconcile 
parliamentary sovereignty with a statutory bill of rights.  The problem was that a statute 
enacted after CBOR was promulgated might be construed to impliedly abrogate the rights 
contained in CBOR.  To prevent this from occurring, section 2 provided “every law of 
Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of Parliament of Canada that it 
shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as 
not to abrogate, abridge or infringe . . . any of the rights and freedoms herein recognized 
and declared.”  CBOR, c. 44, Section 2.   
211 Gardbaum, supra note __, at 720. 
212 Leeson, supra note __, at 7. 
213 Id. at 11-12.  See also MANFREDI, supra note __, at XIII-XVI, 181-84 (2d ed. 
2001). 
214 Paul C. Weiler, Rights and Judges in a Democracy: a New Canadian Version, 
18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 51, 53 (1984). 
 35
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.215  The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom sought 
to adopt the more attractive features of American constitutionalism and reject its more 
repellant ones by constitutionalizing rights while allowing a legislative override.216   
Although the notwithstanding clause was crucial to the adoption of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms and clearly has important theoretical implications, it has not fared 
well in Canada’s constitutional politics.  The few times it has been used have proven 
controversial.  Quebec used the notwithstanding clause to protect primarily language 
rights.217  This led to a strong negative reaction218 as language rights for the French 
minority is a contentious political and constitutional issue.219  The political 
“demonization” of Section 33 has spread to other issues.220  The two major political 
parties have wrangled over whether to use the notwithstanding clause to deal with the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s recent decision on same-sex marriage.221  The politicization 
of same sex marriage in Canada represents the mirror of how that issue has been 
politicized in the United States.  In the United States, it has been conservatives who have 
successfully used same sex marriage as a wedge issue to mobilize voters.  In Canada, it 
has been the Liberal Party that has successfully portrayed the Conservative Party’s 
willingness to use the notwithstanding clause to deal with the same sex jurisprudence of 
the Canadian Supreme Court as “hostility to the Charter itself and thus to fundamental 
Canadian values.”222  Any attempt by the federal or a provincial government to use the 
notwithstanding language in proposed legislation allows the supporters of the primacy of 
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the judiciary in construing the Charter to mobilize.  As a consequence, governments have 
been “exceedingly reluctant to use [section] 33.” 223 
Section 33 has had not only a checkered political history but has also been a 
matter of dispute among scholars who debate whether it contributes to Canada’s 
democracy.  Scholars who believe that section 33 contributes to a democratic “dialogue” 
between legislatures and courts stress that it resolves the countermajoritarian difficulty.224  
Courts are afforded the power of judicial review to ensure that all organs of government 
are subject to constitutional dictates.  The problem, of course, is that constitutional 
restrictions on power are open-ended and afford courts considerable discretion.225  
Professor Weiler notes that the “’fancy claims’ lawyers make about the superiority of 
judges” in construing the constitution must be balanced against the reality that 
legislatures are better equipped to make policy decisions.226  Section 33 deals with this 
problem by providing both courts and legislatures the authority to determine 
constitutional meaning.  Scholars who disagree that section 33 contributes to a 
democratic dialogue point, rather unsurprisingly, to its relative lack of use.227  Professor 
Manfredi argues that judicial review is necessary to make checks and balances work yet 
courts are not subject to any effective checks since section 33 has seldom been used.  
Section 33, in short, may provide a formal solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty 
while not resolving the debilitation problem that may occur when courts gain supremacy 
over constitutional construction.228 
Comparative scholars debate whether section 33 represents an important 
constitutional innovation.  Professor Gardbaum argues that Canada is part of a trend 
among Commonwealth nations to find a middle way between parliamentary and judicial 
supremacy in construing a constitution.229  The notwithstanding clause prevents courts 
from unduly interfering with legislatures by democratizing judicial review.  It was 
designed to prevent the possibility of the impasse between Congress and the Supreme 
Court that led to Franklin Roosevelt’s court packing plan.230  It also serves as a 
breakwater for social mobilization.  When factions are angered by judicial decisions, they 
are more likely to pursue an override than to seek to influence the appointments 
process.231  Professor Mark Tushnet, on the other hand, argues that as a practical matter 
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Canadian courts are supreme in construing the Charter as section 33 is seldom used.232  
The desuetude of section 33 for Professor Tushnet is proof that the public has accepted 
judicial supremacy as legislatures find it politically unpalatable to override judicial 
decisions they disagree with.  For Professor Tushnet, there is no middle ground between 
parliamentary and judicial supremacy. 
This Article argues that the importance of Section 33 lies along a different 
dimension which is how it structures the relationship between society and courts.  
Canada’s Supreme Court is more susceptible than the United States Supreme Court to the 
problem of faction.  There are three principal mechanisms that polities use in appointing 
Justices: monocratic (Canada), majoritarian (the United States), and supermajoritarian 
(the European model).233  Canada follows the British model in providing the chief 
executive virtually unfettered authority to appoint Justices.234  The British system worked 
well when paired with parliamentary supremacy but is problematic when courts have the 
final word on what the constitution means.  Canada, however, has not yet experienced the 
appointment wars that are now part of the American constitutional political landscape.  
The Charter is quite new and the Liberal Party has dominated the government for much 
of its existence which means that there has been little in the way of political struggle over 
appointments.235  More importantly, as the American experience suggests, citizen 
mobilization over appointments is fashioned in a long-term, historical process.  With 
increased experience under the Charter, Canadians may seek to exert greater control over 
the Court as they begin to “appreciate the important role of personalities and judicial 
philosophies in the interpretation and application of Charter norms.”236 
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The importance of section 33 was illustrated by the debate between the two 
leading candidates to become Canada’s Prime Minister in January 2006.  The liberal 
candidate, Paul Martin, sought to gain electoral ground on the conservative front-runner, 
Stephen Harper, by “pledging to repeal Ottawa’s power to override the Charter of 
Rights.”237  Harper opposes same-sex marriage but pledged not to use the 
notwithstanding clause to outlaw same sex-marriage.  Martin’s promise to end the federal 
government’s power to use the override was made to sharpen the parties’ difference on 
the issue of same-sex marriage.  There was considerable criticism of Martin’s proposal, 
however, which suggests that the retention of notwithstanding clause has political 
support.238  The reason that there is more support for retaining the notwithstanding clause 
than there is for its use lies in the function it plays.  Professor Choudry notes: “To its 
defenders, the override serves as an outlet, channeling potentially dangerous and 
destructive responses to judicial review into legislative forums where brute power is 
tempered by the demands of public justification and the procedures for parliamentary 
democracy.”239  In particular, if the citizens are unhappy with a particular constitutional 
provision, they are more likely to seek a legislative override than to pack the courts with 
their supporters.240  Section 33 allows courts to issue opinions that roil the political 
waters while making it less likely that the factions will seek to dominate the appointments 
process.  The notwithstanding clause, in short, functions not unlike the "beware of dog" 
sign that some homeowners put up even though they do not actually own a dog.   
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V. Conclusions: Democratizing Judicial Review 
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital 
questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the 
Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in 
personal actions the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that 
extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent 
tribunal.  Nor is there in this view any assault upon the court or the judges.  It is a 
duty from which they may not shrink to decide cases properly brought before 
them, and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to political 
purposes.241 
Lincoln certainly had it right when he argued that the people will have ceased to 
be their own rulers if courts were to gain constitutional supremacy.  The world’s 
democracies and constitutional theory have been on oddly convergent paths as both seek 
to balance the power of courts and the people over constitutional meaning by 
democratizing judicial review.  The twentieth century witnessed a worldwide expansion 
of judicial review242 as nations democratized243 but polities rejected American style 
strong form review with its correspondingly weak form of political accountability.  No 
polity could readily ignore the power exercised by the American Supreme Court in 
designing judicial review in the twentieth century.  Although there are a number of 
mechanisms that may be used to cabin courts, modern democracies have overwhelmingly 
relied on ex ante and post facto mechanisms of popular control over the meaning of the 
constitution.   
Constitutional theory rather oddly ignored the role that citizens play in shaping 
constitutional meaning until the advent of popular constitutionalism.  American debates 
over the propriety of judicial review were long trapped in a weird nineteenth century time 
warp that courts exercise only judgment244 whereas legislatures exercise will.  The 
countermajoritarian difficulty at bottom posits that courts should police themselves by 
adopting the correct interpretive theory lest they trample on democracy.  The problem 
with Bickel and his interlocutors is that they ignore the role that the people play in 
maintaining the Constitution as a living institution.  The counter-constitutional difficulty, 
on the other hand, acknowledges that the people, not the courts, should be the ultimate 
arbiter of what the Constitution means. 
Courts can and do, however, further the interests of factions rather than those of 
we the people.245  This Article argues that the tension between law and politics, which 
constitutional theory sought to resolve by grappling with the countermajoritarian 
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difficulty, looks very different when viewed from the vantage point of constitutional 
politics.  The problem is not that courts might impermissibly interfere with legislatures 
but that judicial review might facilitate a form of constitutional politics that threatens to 
undermine the constitution.  The easiest way to amend the Constitution is to place one’s 
partisans on the Supreme Court given the rigors of Article V.  A number of decisions by 
the Court have played an important role in mobilizing religious conservatives who now 
seek to amend the Constitution by transforming the membership of the Court.  The 
appointments battles that led to the nominations of Justices Roberts and Alito and to the 
withdrawal of Harriet Miers illustrate the strategy and the power of this conservative 
movement.  By playing an important role in nomination battles, factions shape the 
meaning of the Constitution.  The polarization in the appointments process, in short, 
illustrates the Achilles heel of the Constitution. 
Popular constitutionalism departs from much existing constitutional theory by 
bringing we the people back into our understanding of how constitutional meaning is 
shaped.  Professor Kramer fears that the arrogation of judicial supremacy by the Supreme 
Court will undermine the republican virtues needed to sustain democracy.  Professor 
Tushnet is concerned that judicial review “amounts to noise around zero.”  The United 
States would be better off without it, he argues, so that Americans could discuss the 
principles that constitute their collective national identity in the venues of ordinary 
politics.  Kramer and Tushnet are right to underscore the danger of citizens losing 
attachment to the Constitution.   
The problem with popular constitutionalism, however, is that the people have 
never supinely accepted the power of a political body, even one as august as the Supreme 
Court of the United States, to define the identity of a nation.  American history is replete 
with social movements that fought over the meaning of the Constitution.246  Social 
movements can seek constitutional change either by changing public opinion or by 
changing the membership of the Supreme Court.247  The former plays a key role in 
maintaining the constitution as a living institution248 whereas the latter erodes democracy.  
Constitutional democracy works when it channels social forces seeking change into a two 
level game.  A bare majority is needed to change ordinary law whereas a supermajority is 
required to change the Constitution.  Appointments battles blur the line between ordinary 
and constitutional politics that is critical for the long-term viability of democracy.249 
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Appointment battles not only erode the rigidity of a constitution but also 
undermine the ability of courts to ameliorate political conflict.250  Polities throughout 
space and time rely on courts to handle disputes because it is universally understood that 
a neutral third party is the fairest means for resolving disputes.251  For courts to be able to 
reduce social tensions, however, they must be perceived as fair and independent.  If 
courts are seen as the pawn of interest group struggles, the social trust they need to 
ameliorate political conflict is eroded.  As E.P. Thompson writes, “If the law is evidently 
partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any 
class’s hegemony.  The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law . . . . is that it 
shall display an independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to be just.”252   
The American adherence to weak political controls over constitutional review is 
deeply ingrained but the die that was cast in Philadelphia was more the result of historical 
accident than any prolonged inquiry.  Constitution makers are not free to remake the 
world anew but are constrained by the operative assumptions of the intellectual milieu 
within which they operate as well as political reality.253  The intellectual assumption on 
which American judicial review is built is a sharp distinction between law and politics.  
This distinction provided the intellectual foundations of Marbury v. Madison254 and 
continues to provide the grist for the continuing fascination that constitutional scholars 
have for Bickel’s countermajoritarian mill.  If what the courts do is law and what 
legislatures do is politics, then maintaining the distinction between these two spheres is 
critical if judicial review is to be legitimate in a democracy. 
The institutional counterpoint to the distinction between law and politics that the 
framers uncritically assumed are the weak forms of democratic control that the Supreme 
Court is subject to.  It is not surprising that elites whose lives spanned a transformation 
from a monarchical and hierarchical society to a republican and egalitarian one255 would 
fear the very changes they helped usher in.256  They understood that democracy would 
bring about important social transformations and sought to hem these changes in by 
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fashioning a court free of democratic constraints that would stand guard over what 
majorities could do.257  Lifetime tenure coupled with virtuous judges drawn from a 
narrow circle would hopefully prevent future democratic majorities from working their 
will. 
It should not be that surprising that the United States got it wrong and the rest of 
the world got it more or less right when it comes to judicial review.  The framers could 
not foresee the role that judicial review would play in American politics.  The continued 
American adherence to weak political controls over judicial review owes more to path 
dependency than to an ideological commitment to judicial supremacy in constitutional 
interpretation.  The democratic changes made to judicial review in the process of legal 
transplantation in Europe and in Canada are significant.  These changes can best be 
explained by the notion of political learning.  Elites study and learn from the legal and 
political experience of other nations.258  The rest of the world adopted stronger political 
controls over their respective supreme courts because elites in those polities 
understandably feared fashioning a constitutional court that would exercise the power of 
the American Supreme Court.  No nation adopting judicial review in the late twentieth 
century could ignore the political dimensions of constitutional law.  As a consequence of 
this political learning, the nations of continental Europe constructed a different 
appointments process that makes it very difficult for minorities to place their partisans on 
a nation’s highest court.  Canada made it unlikely that factions would arise to seek to 
control its highest court by allowing for the possibility of a legislative override.  The 
European and Canadian forms of judicial review, in short, sought to preserve a stronger 
role for Parliament by creating stronger democratic constraints on judicial review.   
The problem in designing judicial review lies in how best to design the 
institutional mechanisms that enable citizens to exercise control over the meaning of the 
constitution.  As the following table illustrates, American exceptionalism forces citizens 
to utilize ex ante mechanisms of control whereas other polities structure judicial review 
to facilitate post facto control mechanisms: 
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POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY259 
 
 Ex Ante 
(Appointments) 
Post Facto 
(Legislative override, 
amendments) 
 
Weak 
 
 
 
Monocratic (Canada) 
 
Majoritarian (United States) 
United States (supermajority 
required both in Congress 
and among the states) 
Strong 
 
 
 
 
 
Supermajoritarian (Europe) 
Europe (typically 
supermajority required in 
Parliament) 
 
Canada (majority for 
temporary override) 
 
Citizens in the United States have little choice but to engage in appointments battles 
given the difficulty of amending the Constitution.  Citizens in a polity that has the 
European model of judicial review, on the other hand, will be more likely to seek 
constitutional change through amendment than through the uncertain path of changing 
the membership of a constitutional court.  Canada falls in between the American and 
European models of judicial review as citizens can influence both appointments and seek 
a legislative override.  Social movements are more likely to seek an override than to seek 
to change the membership of the Canadian Supreme Court, however, given that 
appointments battles produce an uncertain pay-off.  Post facto mechanisms are superior 
to ex ante mechanisms of popular control as they neither interfere with judicial 
independence nor undermine constitutional rigidity. 
Bickel and his interlocutors would have done well to have considered 
comparatively how judicial review shapes the politics of constitutional change.  The 
countermajoritarian difficulty has dominated constitutional theory in this country for over 
half a century.  The problem has had less purchase abroad because constitutional courts 
are subject to greater political oversight than they are in the United States.  The 
experience of the United States teaches us that courts can become a dangerous branch if 
they lack efficacious mechanisms of democratic control.  The experience of Europe and 
Canada teaches us that by ensuring that democratic majorities have some power over 
either the make-up of constitutional courts or over their decisions, courts do a better job 
of ameliorating political conflict.  In short, the countermajoritarian difficulty dissolves 
when judicial review is democratized so that courts cannot be counterconstitutional 
actors.  
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